HHMI HOWARD HUGHES MEDICAL INSTITUTE

RISK ASSESSMENT AND CONTAINMENT

Presented by

W. Emmett Barkley

Director, Office of Laboratory Safety Howard Hughes Medical Institute September 21, 2004

©2004 Howard Hughes Medical Institute

RISK ASSESSMENT

- Identifying risk factors
- Evaluating the likelihood for exposure
- Evaluating the potential consequences of an exposure
- Evaluating the capability of safeguards to control risks



IDENTIFYING RISK FACTORS

- Agent hazards
- Protocol hazards
- Susceptibility to disease of at-risk persons



September 21, 2004 RISK ASSESSMENT AND CONTAINMENT

AGENT HAZARDS

- Pathogenicity
- Virulence
- Infectious dose
- Route of transmission
- Agent stability
- Host range



INFECTIOUS DOSE FOR 25 TO 50% OF HUMAN VOLUNTEERS

Agent		Dose	Route of Inoculation
•	Francisella tularensis	10	Inhalation
•	Coxiella burnetii	10	Inhalation
•	Mycobacterium tuberculosis	<10	Inhalation
•	Salmonella typhi	10 ⁵	Ingestion
•	Francisella tularensis	10 ⁸	Ingestion
•	VEEV	1 (a)	Subcutaneous
•	Influenza A2 virus	<790 ^(b)	Nasopharyngeal
	Measles virus	0.2 ^(c)	Intranasal spray

- ^(a) Minimum infectious dose; Guinea pig infective unit
- ^(b) Minimum infectious dose
- ^(c) Medium infectious tissue culture dose in children

PROTOCOL HAZARDS

- Agent concentration
- Manipulations that produce droplets and aerosols
- Manipulations involving sharps
- Manipulations with high potential for spills and splashes
- Exposure to zoonotic diseases of experimental animals
- Alteration of agent hazards



RISK FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH EXPERIMENTAL RECOMBINATION OF INFECTIOUS AGENTS

- Virulence
- Host range
- Compromise use of effective treatments
- Vigilance



HUMAN SUSCEPTIBILITY TO DISEASE

- Wide variation in infectious dose
- Reduced immunological competency
- Availability of vaccines, treatments
- Occupational medical evaluation



LIKELIHOOD OF EXPOSURE

- Person conducting protocol
- Other person in same lab
- Person not associated with the lab



September 21, 2004 RISK ASSESSMENT AND CONTAINMENT

MOST FREQUENTLY DOCUMENTED REPORTS OF LABORATORY-ASSOCIATED INFECTIONS - 1930 to 1999

Agent		Laboratory-associated Infections		
•	Brucella sp.	507		
•	Coxiella burnetii	456		
•	Mycobacterium tuberculosis	417		
•	Hepatitis viruses	380		
•	Salmonella sp.	324		
•	Francisella tularensis	225		
•	Hantavirus	169		
•	Venezuelan equine encephalomy	elitis virus 150		
•	(Influenza A2 virus)	(15)		

HHMI HOWARD HUGHES MEDICAL INSTITUTE

AEROSOL RISK FACTORS

- Infectivity
- Viability
- Aerosol concentration
- Particle size



September 21, 2004 RISK ASSESSMENT AND CONTAINMENT

AEROSOL AND SURFACE RECOVERY FROM 10 PIPETTING OPERATIONS OF 10⁹/ML *B. SUBTILIS* (AVERAGE TIME 3 MIN; 1 ML PIPETTE; 2 ML BULB PIPETTER)

Summary Data	Airborne	Settled	Settled CFU	
from 6 runs	CFU	Hands	Area	
Lowest count	388	6,900	550	
 Average count 	1,820	52,800	1,970	
 Highest count 	5,110	228,000	3,700	

Adapted from Chatigny, 1979



ESTIMATED AEROSOL EXPOSURE DOSE FROM PIPETTING OPERATION

Individual Exposed	Good Technique	Poor Technique	
 Person pipetting 	25	1,200	
Person in the room	<1	30	
Assumptions:			
Concentration	10 ⁹ / ml		
Time of operation	3 min.		
Room volume	1,000 cu.ft.		
Breathing zone around op	erator 27 cu.ft.		
Breathing rate	1/3 cu.ft. / mir	۱.	
Uniform diffusion of aerosol in room			



ESTIMATED AEROSOL EXPOSURE DOSE FROM OTHER OPERATIONS

Operation		Viable Particles
•	Blender lid opening after stop	1200
e,	Sonic homogenizer (max aeration)	1200
	(min aeration)	6
e,	Streaking petri dish	<1
e,	Dropping flask culture	360
•	Splash on centrifuge rotor	120



OUTBREAKS OF LABORATORY-ASSOCIATED INFECTIONS (LAI) WITHIN INSTITUTIONS

<u>A</u>	gent	Outbreaks	LAI	Period
•	Coxiella burnetti	9	356	<1965
•	Brucella sp.	8	160	<1941
•	LCM virus	3	81	<1975
•	Rickettsia prowazekii; R. typhi	3	59	<1954
•	Viral hemorrhagic fever (renal syndrome)	· 1	113	1962

Adapted from Wedum, 1976



CONTAINMENT

- Microbiological practices
 - **Technical proficiency**
 - Sterile technique
 - Washing hands
 - Good habits
- Primary barriers
 - **Biological safety cabinets**
 - Personal protective equipment



CONTAINMENT (*CONTINUED*)

- Facility safeguards
 Access control
 Directional air flow
- Hybrid containment

Adding BSL-3 safeguards to BSL-2 Adding BSL-4 safeguards to BSL-3

